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Abstract 
In OECD countries, both life expectancy and elderly labor participation are increasing. 
The retirement age is being raised continually. The age at which pension benefits start 
is also being raised by governments. This paper presents an examination of how an 
increase in elderly labor participation affects saving and fertility in an endogenous 
fertility model with uncertainty of wage income during the old period. In the model with 
uncertainty, an increase in elderly labor time reduces savings. Thereby, fertility 
increases. However, without an increase in the average, an increase in the variance of 
wage income for elderly people increases savings and reduces fertility. 
 
JEL Classification: J14, J13, J26 
Keywords: Elderly labor, Fertility, Precautionary saving 
 
 
  
                                                   
† Research for this paper was supported financially by JSPS KAKENHI No. 17K03746 and No. 
17K03791. Nevertheless, remaining errors are the author's responsibility. 
‡ Corresponding to: School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, 1-155 Uegahara Ichiban-Cho, 
Nishinomiya, Hyogo 662-8501 Japan, Tel.:+81-798-54-6993, E-mail: yasuoka@kwansei.ac.jp 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
In Japan, the aged population ratio is increasing. The sustainability of social security 
has persisted as a concern. Moreover, government policy has raised the starting age of 
pension benefits to 65 years old. The labor force participation rate of people older than 
60 years old has therefore increased. Figure 1 portrays the labor force participation rate 
60–64-year–old people in several OECD countries. 
 
[Insert Fig. 1 around here.] 
 
In Japan and in other OECD countries, the labor force participation rate of elderly 
people has increased. A worldwide trend exists by which the starting age of pension 
benefits has been increased. For that reason, labor participation by elderly people has 
increased. Japanese government policies are designed to facilitate elderly labor 
participation. For instance, the retirement age has been raised and wage income for 
elderly labor is subsidized. 
An increase in elderly labor participation helps to resolve shortages of labor input in 
Japan. Furthermore, the government can cut pension benefits because elderly people 
can obtain labor income instead. This flexibility is expected to contribute to the 
sustainability of social security. 
Some reports of the literature have described retirement and elderly labor 
participation. Matsuyama (2008) sets a binary choice model for the elderly labor supply. 
Elderly people work during the old period if the retirement benefit is smaller than the 
benefit from continuing labor during the old period. Gong and Liu (2012) sets a model 
continuous of labor supply in the old period. Using the Gong and Liu (2012) model, the 
time at which elderly people stop working during the old period can be derived: the 
retirement timing is therefore endogenized. The subsidy for elderly labor increases the 
benefits of working during the old period. Miyake and Yasuoka (2018) derive that the 
subsidy for elderly labor postpones retirement. Timing of compulsory retirement is 
examined by Kunze (2014). Correlation between the income growth rate and retirement 
is derived. 
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Retirement is considered along with the pension system in some reports of the relevant 
literature. Conde Ruiz and Galasso (2003, 2004) examine pension system effects on the 
retirement age. They derive that low-productivity workers choose retirement to obtain 
pension benefits. Maeda and Momota (2002) and Momota (2003) derive a correlation 
between the pension and retirement. 
One paper describes that retirement timing affects fertility. An increase in life 
expectancy decreases fertility, as shown by relevant data and the related literature, with 
reports by Yakita (2001) and others. However, if retirement is postponed because of 
increased life expectancy, then the lifetime income increases and child care expenditures 
increase. Eventually, fertility can be pulled up. This result was derived by Mizuno and 
Yakita (2013). 
This paper presents an examination of how elderly labor affects saving and fertility 
in an endogenous fertility model. However, different from reports of the related literature, 
this paper presents consideration of uncertainty related to wage income during the old 
period. Wage income in the old period should be regarded as uncertain because wage 
income during the old period is determined by the health status, economic conditions 
and other factors. Individuals are unable to estimate their future income correctly. 
Results obtained from the analyses presented in this paper are the following. An 
increase in the elderly labor time decreases saving and increases fertility. An increase in 
the variance of wage income during the old period without an increase in the average 
increases precautionary saving. For that reason, fertility decreases even if the lifetime 
income eventually increases. Leland (1968), Caballero (1991), Liljas (1998), Picone et al. 
(1998), and Hemmi et al. (2007) derive precautionary saving in uncertainty related to 
income and assets. That uncertainty brings about precautionary saving and decreases 
fertility even if individuals can obtain more income ex post. The analyses described in 
this paper demonstrate that uncertainty exerts a negative effect on fertility. 
The remainder of this paper presents the following. Section 2 sets the model without 
uncertainty to show the contributions of this paper. Section 3 sets the model with 
uncertainty for wage income during the old period and then presents derivation of 
fertility and saving. This paper presents consideration of exogenous retirement timing. 
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The result obtained from these analyses is not different if this assumption is mitigated 
as endogenous retirement timing. This point is examined in Section 4. Section 5 presents 
discussion of a subsidy for elderly labor and how such a subsidy should be provided. The 
final section concludes this paper. 
 
2. Model without uncertainty 
First, we set the model without uncertainty related to the wage income during the old 
period. Individuals in households exist in two periods: young and old. During the young 
period, individuals work to obtain a wage income and to bring up children. The budget 
constraint is given as shown below. 
𝑧𝑛 + 𝑠 = (1 − 𝜏)𝑤௬ (1) 
Therein, 𝑛 denotes the number of children or fertility. 𝑧 is necessary to bring up a child. 
𝑠 represents saving for later consumption during the old period. 𝑤௬ denotes the wage 
rate of younger labor. 𝜏 denotes the pension contribution rate. 
During the old period, individuals work to obtain wages. After retirement, they can 
obtain pension benefits. Without the motivation of a bequest, consumption during the 
older period is financed by saving. Labor income and the pension are given as shown 
below. 
𝑐 = (1 + 𝑟)𝑠 + 𝑙𝑤௢ + (1 − 𝑙)𝑝 (2) 
In that equation, 𝑐 denotes consumption in the old period. 𝑟 represents the interest 
rate. 𝑤௢ denotes the wage rate of older labor. Defining 𝑙 as the time of labor during the 
old period, 1 − 𝑙 shows the retirement period. Defining 𝑝 as the pension benefit, they 
can obtain the pension benefit (1 − 𝑙)𝑝, based on the retirement period. 
The utility function is assumed to be the following. 
𝑢 = 𝛼𝑙𝑛𝑛 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑙𝑛𝑐, 0 < 𝛼 < 1. (3) 
  The optimal allocations to maximize the utility (3) subject to (1) and (2) are shown as 
presented below. 
𝑛 =
𝛼 ቆ(1 − 𝜏)𝑤௬ + 𝑙𝑤
௢ + (1 − 𝑙)𝑝
1 + 𝑟 ቇ
𝑧
 
(4) 
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𝑐 = (1 − 𝛼)(1 + 𝑟) ൭(1 − 𝜏)𝑤௬ +
𝑙𝑤௢ + (1 − 𝑙)𝑝
1 + 𝑟
൱ (5) 
If 𝑤௢ > 𝑝 and the timing of retirement is delayed, the household lifetime income 
increases; fertility rises. Then, saving decreases. This result demonstrates positive 
correlation between fertility and elderly labor supply. 
If the pension benefit financed as the pay-as-you-go system, then the pension benefit 
can be shown as 
(1 − 𝑙)𝑝 = 𝑛𝜏𝑤௬. (6) 
Inserting (6) into (4), we can obtain fertility to satisfy the following equation. 
𝑛 =
𝛼 ቆ𝑤௬ +
𝑙𝑤௢ + 𝜏൫𝑛 − (1 + 𝑟)൯𝑤௬
1 + 𝑟 ቇ
𝑧
 
(7) 
An increase in the labor supply during the old period 𝑙 raises fertility, irrespective of 
the level of 𝑤௢. This result reflects positive correlation between fertility and the labor 
supply of elderly people. 
 
3. Uncertainty of wage income during the old period. 
In this section, we consider the uncertainty of wage income during the old period. 𝑤௢ is 
assumed to be distributed uniformly between [0, 𝑤ഥ]. Then, optimal saving 𝑠 is given to 
satisfy the following equation. 
𝛼
1 − 𝛼
1
(1 − 𝜏)𝑤௬ − 𝑠
= 𝐸
1 + 𝑟
(1 + 𝑟)𝑠 + 𝑙𝑤௢ + (1 − 𝑙)𝑝
 (8) 
Therein, 𝐸 denotes the expectation operator. Because of the uniform distribution of 𝑤௢, 
the expected that the marginal utility of 𝑠 𝐸 ଵା௥(ଵା௥)௦ା௟௪೚ା(ଵି௟)௣ can be shown as 
𝐸
1 + 𝑟
(1 + 𝑟)𝑠 + 𝑙𝑤௢ + (1 − 𝑙)𝑝
=
1 + 𝑟
𝑙𝑤ഥ
𝑙𝑛 ൬
𝑙𝑤ഥ
(1 + 𝑟)𝑠 + (1 − 𝑙)𝑝
+ 1൰. (9) 
Then, because of (8) and (9), optimal saving 𝑠 is given for the following equation. 
𝛼
1 − 𝛼
1
(1 − 𝜏)𝑤௬ − 𝑠
=
1 + 𝑟
𝑙𝑤ഥ
𝑙𝑛 ൬
𝑙𝑤ഥ
(1 + 𝑟)𝑠 + (1 − 𝑙)𝑝
+ 1൰ (10) 
Then, we can depict the following figure to derive optimal saving 𝑠 as follows. 
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[Insert Fig. 2 around here.] 
 
For simplicity, we consider the model economy without the pension. With an increase 
in 𝑙, the labor supply of elderly people, the 𝑅 curve shifts upward or downward. By 
differentiating 𝐿 with respect to 𝑙, one can obtain the following. 
−
𝑙𝑛 ൬1 + 𝑙𝑤ഥ(1 + 𝑟)𝑠൰
𝑙ଶ
+
1
𝑙
𝑤ഥ
(1 + 𝑟)𝑠
1 + 𝑙𝑤ഥ(1 + 𝑟)𝑠
=
𝑙𝑛 ൬1 + 𝑙𝑤ഥ(1 + 𝑟)𝑠൰
𝑙ଶ
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎛
𝑑𝑙𝑛 ൬1 + 𝑙𝑤ഥ(1 + 𝑟)𝑠൰
𝑙𝑛 ൬1 + 𝑙𝑤ഥ(1 + 𝑟)𝑠൰
𝑑𝑙
𝑙
− 1
⎠
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎞
 
(11) 
Therein, 
೏೗೙൬భశ ೗ ഥೢ(భశೝ)ೞ൰
೗೙൬భశ ೗ ഥೢ(భశೝ)ೞ൰
೏೗
೗
 represents the elasticity related to how 𝑙𝑛 ቀ1 + ௟௪ഥ(ଵା௥)௦ቁ changes in 
the change of 𝑙. Defining 
೏೗೙൬భశ ೗ ഥೢ(భశೝ)ೞ൰
೗೙൬భశ ೗ ഥೢ(భశೝ)ೞ൰
೏೗
೗
= 𝜀, inelasticity case 𝜀 < 1 makes 𝑅 shift down. 
Saving decreases. However, with inelasticity case 𝜀 > 1, an increase in 𝑙 raises saving; 
consequently, fertility decreases. 
An increase in 𝑙  signifies an increase in wage income in the older period. 
Consequently, the average and variance of wage income 𝑙𝑤௢ in the older period increase. 
Because of increased variance, they deal with low wage income during the old period and 
then increase saving as precautionary saving. However, an increase in the average 
decreases saving for consumption in the old period. Considering the following figure, we 
can obtain the result that an increase in 𝑙 decreases saving as shown in Fig. 3.1 
 
[Insert Fig. 3 around here.] 
 
                                                   
1 This paper assumes a log utility function. However, as shown by Fig. 3, given the assumption of 𝑢′ >
0, 𝑢′′ < 0 and additive separability, we can obtain the same result using the log utility assumption. 
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In the figure, A and B respectively show the utility level at (1 + 𝑟)𝑠 and (1 + 𝑟)𝑠 +
𝑙𝑤ഥ . The expected marginal utility of (1 − 𝛼)𝑙𝑛𝑐 is given as the middle point of the line 
AB. Then, at the optimal allocations, the level of expected marginal utility of (1 − 𝛼)𝑙𝑛𝑐 
is equal to the level of marginal utility 𝛼𝑙𝑛𝑛 . An increase in 𝑙  raises the expected 
marginal utility of (1 − 𝛼)𝑙𝑛𝑐. We obtain ఈ
௡
> 𝐸 ଵିఈ
௖
 for saving before an increase in 𝑙. 
Therefore, individuals reduce savings such that ఈ
௡
= 𝐸 ଵିఈ
௖
 holds. Then, the following 
proposition can be established. 
 
Proposition 1 
An increase in the labor supply time during the old period decreases saving. Then, 
fertility increases. 
 
An increase in 𝑙 raises the variance of wage income during the old period. Then, the 
precautionary saving can be pulled up. Simultaneously, the average of wage income 
during the old period rises. This effect decreases saving. These two effects determine the 
change of saving. However, one can obtain the results by which an increase in the 
variance decreases saving and by which the positive correlation between elderly labor 
supply and fertility is obtainable. 
In the case of (1 − 𝑙)𝑝 ≠ 0, an increase in 𝑙 decreases pension benefit (1 − 𝑙)𝑝. This 
effect increases saving because of the consumption in the old period. Finally, two effects 
of an increase in the variance in wage income during the old period and a decrease in 
pension benefit should be regarded as examining the effects on saving if we consider the 
reform case in which the elderly labor supply increases instead of the pension cut. A 
decrease in (1 − 𝑙)𝑝 increases saving. The negative effect of an increase in the variance 
of wage income during the old period on saving is therefore weakened. 
Now, we consider the other uniform distribution. The range is assumed to be 
[(1 − 𝜎)𝑤ഥ, (1 + 𝜎)𝑤ഥ ], 0 < 𝜎 < 1. An increase in 𝜎  raises the variance of wage income 
during the old period. However, the average does not change. The density function is 
given as ଵ
ଶఙ௪ഥ
. Then, (10) changes the following equation. 
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𝛼
1 − 𝛼
1
𝑤௬ − 𝑠
=
1 + 𝑟
2𝑙𝜎𝑤ഥ
𝑙𝑛 ቆ
(1 + 𝑟)𝑠 + (1 + 𝜎)𝑤ഥ
(1 + 𝑟)𝑠 + (1 − 𝜎)𝑤ഥ
ቇ (12) 
Considering the following figure, we can obtain the result demonstrating that an 
increase in the variance increases saving. 
 
[Insert Fig. 4 around here.] 
 
As shown by Fig. 4, for fixed 𝑠 at the optimal level before increasing the variance, we 
can obtain ఈ
௡
< 𝐸 ଵିఈ
௖
. The levels of 𝐸 ଵିఈ
௖
 and ఈ
௡
 are shown respectively by 𝐶 and 𝐷 in 
Fig. 4. Because of ఈ
௡
< 𝐸 ଵିఈ
௖
, individuals increase saving such that ఈ
௡
= 𝐸 ଵିఈ
௖
. 
 
3. Binary choice model of labor and pension 
This section presents consideration of the model by which individuals choose labor 
during the old period or to obtain the pension benefit instead of quitting the labor force 
during the old period. If they choose labor during the old period, then 𝑙 = 1. Otherwise, 
𝑙 = 0. In the case of 𝑙 = 1, the optimal saving is given by the following equation as 
𝛼
1 − 𝛼
1
(1 − 𝜏)𝑤௬ − 𝑠
=
1 + 𝑟
𝑤ഥ
𝑙𝑛 ൬1 +
𝑤ഥ
(1 + 𝑟)𝑠
൰.  (13) 
   For 𝑙 = 0, the optimal saving is given by the following equation: 
𝛼
1 − 𝛼
1
(1 − 𝜏)𝑤௬ − 𝑠
=
1 + 𝑟
(1 + 𝑟)𝑠 + 𝑝
.  (14) 
Then, defining the right-hand side of (13) and (14) as 𝑅1 and 𝑅0, respectively, the 
optimal saving is given by the intersection of 𝐿 and 𝑅 in Fig. 5.2 
 
[Insert Fig. 5 around here.] 
 
Actually, 𝐿 can be depicted as a solid line if α is small. Then, the optimal saving in the 
cases of 𝑙 = 1 and 𝑙 = 0 as 𝑠ଵ and 𝑠଴, respectively; we can obtain 𝑠ଵ < 𝑠଴. Then, the 
                                                   
2 We can verify that R0 is always above R1, as shown by the numerical check if the pension benefit is 
zero or small. Therefore, this paper includes consideration of the case of a non-small pension benefit. 
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case of labor during the old period brings about more saving. However, fertility remains 
low in the case of 𝑠଴. 
Consequently, 𝐿 can be depicted as a dashed line if α is large. We can obtain 𝑠ଵ >
𝑠଴. Fertility in the case of 𝑙 = 0 is less than in the case of 𝑙 = 1. Then, the following 
proposition can be established. 
 
Proposition 2 
With a small preference for rearing children, saving in the case of labor during the old 
period is smaller than the case of pension without labor during the old period. However, 
in the case of large preference for rearing children, the order of the level of saving 
changes. 
 
Given a small preference for rearing children, saving is large because the preference 
for consumption during the old period is large. In this case, uncertainty of the wage 
income during the old period decreases the marginal utility of an increase in saving. 
Then, the individuals reduce saving and raise fertility in the young period without 
uncertainty. 
However, given a large preference for children, saving is small. Then, the uncertainty 
raises the marginal utility of saving. 
 
4. Endogenous labor supply and uncertainty 
This section presents consideration of the case of endogenous labor supply in the older 
period. In the preceding section, the labor supply during the old period is exogenous. Now, 
we consider the following utility function as 
𝑢 = 𝛼𝑙𝑛𝑛 + 𝐸𝑣, 0 < 𝛼 < 1. (15) 
Therein, the following variable is used: 
𝑣 = (1 − 𝛼)𝑙𝑛𝑐 + 𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝑙). (16) 
The budget constraints are given as (1) and (2). In this section, we derive the optimal 
allocations by a backward solution. 
In the old period, older people maximize utility function (16) subject to (2). In the old 
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period, saving is regarded as given. The wage rate in the older period is regarded as a 
certain variable. Then, the labor supply during the old period to maximize utility (16) is 
shown such that the following equation holds: 
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑙
= (1 − 𝛼)
𝑤௢ − 𝑝
(1 + 𝑟)𝑠 + 𝑙𝑤௢ + (1 − 𝑙)𝑝
−
1
1 − 𝑙
= 0. (17) 
Therefore, we can obtain the labor supply during the old period as 
𝑙 =
(1 − 𝛼)𝑤௢ − (2 − 𝛼)𝑝 − (1 + 𝑟)𝑠
(2 − 𝛼)(𝑤௢ − 𝑝)
. (18) 
Inserting (16) and (18) into (15), one derive the optimal saving to maximize the utility 
function (15). Optimal saving is shown according to the following equation: 
1
(1 − 𝜏)𝑤௬ − 𝑠
=
1 + 𝑟
𝑤ഥ
𝑙𝑛
𝑤ഥ + (1 + 𝑟)𝑠
(1 + 𝑟)𝑠
. (19) 
Defining the left-hand side and the right-hand side of (19) respectively as 𝐿 and 𝑅, 
the optimal saving is obtainable, as shown by Fig. 1. During the young period, the 
individuals undertake precautionary saving for the uncertainty of wage income during 
the old period. However, the wage income during the old period is determined; 
uncertainty is eliminated if they live during the old period. Then, the individuals 
undertake over-consumption because they have no bequest motivation. Therefore, to 
decrease over-consumption, the individuals reduce working time and raise their leisure 
time. However, the wage income during the old period is an opportunity cost associated 
with having leisure. Therefore, an effect exists by which the working time of elderly 
people increases if the wage income during the old period is larger. 
 
5. Discussion 
In OECD countries, the labor participation rate of elderly people increases. The labor 
participation rate in Japan is at a high level in OECD countries. These results are 
presented in Fig. 1. The subsidy for elderly people is provided to facilitate the labor 
participation of elderly people. The subsidy raises the wage income during the old period 
and raises the opportunity cost to have leisure. However, simultaneously, the variance 
of wage income during the old period rises because of an increase in wage income that 
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elderly people can obtain. As shown by Fig. 3, saving decreases and fertility rises because 
the subsidy for the wage income raises the average and the variance of the wage income 
during the old period. 
However, if the variance of wage income during the old period increases without an 
increase in the average, then precautionary saving can be facilitated and fertility 
decreases. This outcome leads to the fewer children problem. Therefore, if government 
policy is intended to solve not only the shortage of labor supply in the aging society but 
also the problem posed by fewer children, a government should alleviate uncertainty. As 
a policy to eliminate the wage income uncertainty in the old period, wage income 
insurance can be considered. The insurance provides income to meet an average income 
level if the elderly person obtains a less than average wage income. Instead of this 
insurance, if the older person can obtain more than the average income level, then the 
income that is more than the average income is collected for insurance. Then, older 
people can always obtain the average income and no uncertainty arises. By virtue of 
mitigating uncertainty, precautionary saving is reduced. Fertility can thereby be pulled 
up. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper presents an examination of how household saving is determined according to 
uncertainty of wage income during the old period in the endogenous fertility model. 
Without uncertainty, an increase in wage income during the old period decreases saving 
and fertility increases. This result is obtainable in the uncertainty case that the average 
and the variance of the wage income in the old period increase. However, an increase in 
the variance of wage income during the old period without an increase in the average 
raises saving and decreases fertility. 
Because of precautionary saving, expenditures during the young period decrease. 
These expenditures include not only consumption but also expenditures for child care. 
Because of the uncertainty of wage income during the old period, expenditures for child 
care decrease; then fertility decreases. 
As a policy supporting pension system sustainability, OECD governments pull up the 
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starting age of pension benefits. Then, the elderly labor supply increases. However, if 
the variance of wage income during the old period increases, then precautionary saving 
can be facilitated and fertility is thereby decreased. The problem of fewer children is a 
severer problem. The sustainability of social security is thus weakened. 
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Fig. 1: Labor Force Participation Rate of 60–64-year-old People (Data: OECD Statistics). 
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Fig. 2: Optimal Saving. 
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Fig. 3: Optimal Saving (Case of a Decrease in Saving). 
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Fig. 4: Optimal Saving (Case of an Increase in Saving). 
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Fig. 5: Optimal Saving. 
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